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IV 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 
of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78A-4-103,63G-4-403; and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is there substantial evidence to support the finding that the claimant voluntarily quit 
his employment without good cause or that a denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness 
under the equity and good conscience provisions of the rules? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves a mixed question of law and fact. "Whether 'good cause' [to quit 
employment] exists is a mixed question of law and fact." Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d 
626, 630 (Utah 1977). This Court's review under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
is governed by Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403 "which provides for appellate relief in the event 
an agency erroneously interprets or applies the law." Adams v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
639,641 (Utah 1989). 
Resolution of the issues in this case requires the interpretation of two statutory 
provisions. The first, Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(l)(a) (2007) provides that a claimant is 
ineligible for benefits if he "left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the 
division, . . . ." The Utah Supreme Court held, in Robinson v. Department of Employment 
Sec, that the statutory language in question 
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explicitly grants the [division] discretion to determine issues involving 
voluntariness and good cause. Accordingly, in reviewing these issues, we 
defer to the agency and we will not overturn its decisions regarding 
voluntariness and good cause unless we determine it has abused its discretion. 
Robinson v. Department of Employment Sec, 827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
The second statutory provision is Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(l)(b) (2007) which 
provides that 
A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves 
work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The equity and good conscience standard 
requires the Board to consider factors such as 'the reasonableness of the 
claimant's actions' and 'continuing attachment to the labor market.' Because 
the statute does not further define these terms, and because the terms are broad 
and generalized, the statute implicitly grants the Board discretion to interpret 
the terms in determining equity and good conscience.... We therefore apply 
a reasonableness standard to this issue also. Id. at 254. [referring to what is 
now §35A-4-405(l)(c)] 
See also Morton Int'lv. AuditingDiv. OfUtahState Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581, 588 
(Utah 1991). 
Under the reasoning in Robinson and in Morton, this court should grant deference to 
the Workforce Appeals Board and not overturn its decision absent a finding of an abuse of 
discretion. 
The question of whether the claimant voluntarily quit his employment is a question 
of fact. Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P. 2d 625 (Utah 1985). The Board should be 
upheld if there is substantial evidence to support its decision. 
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STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim in 
Addendum A, and include the following: 
§35A-4-405(l), Utah Code Annotated 
§63-46b-16(4)(b), Utah Code Annotated, now §63G-4-403 
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated 
R994-403-110c(2)(b), Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-101, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-102, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-103, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-106, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-107(6), Utah Administrative Code 
R994-405-204, Utah Administrative Code 
R994-508-109(11), Utah Administrative Code 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
The claimant, Kenneth Bowdrey, filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits 
on January 28, 2009, with an effective date of January 25, 2009. An initial decision by a 
Department of Workforce Services (Department) adjudicator denied benefits on the grounds 
the claimant voluntarily quit his employment without good cause and that a denial of benefits 
is not an affront to fairness under the equity and good conscience standard in Utah Code 
Ann. §35A-4-405(l). The Department's original decision was issued on February 11,2009. 
(See Addendum B) The claimant appealed that decision to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) and an evidentiary hearing was held on March 30,2009. On March 30,2009, the ALJ 
issued a decision affirming the Department's original decision denying benefits. (See 
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Addendum C) The claimant appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Workforce Appeals 
Board (Board). In a decision issued May 18,2009, the Board unanimously upheld the ALJ's 
decision denying unemployment benefits. The claimant's Petition for Review was filed 
June 17,2009. 
B. Statement of the Facts, 
The claimant started working for the employer, Pacific Flyway Wholesale, on or about 
May 18, 2007, as a shipper. He worked the weekend shift which was Friday, Saturday, and 
Sunday, 12 hours per day. (Record, 30:4-7) The claimant had purchased an automobile with 
his girlfriend. Sometime prior to the job separation, the claimant moved out of the residence 
he shared with his girlfriend into a motel. He left the car with his girlfriend, (R, 26:7, 
R5 27:38-39) explaining that the girlfriend had children and needed the car more than he did. 
The claimant told the employer he no longer had a car and asked to be moved to a different 
shift so he could take the bus to work. At the claimant's request, the employer agreed to let 
the claimant work on "a shift that would accommodate his needs." (R, 30:6-7) The new shift 
was Monday through Thursday, 6 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. He started working that shift on Monday, 
August 18, 2008. (R, 30: 11-13, 21-22) His last day of work was August 20, 2008. 
(R, 29:43) He did not show up for his scheduled shift on August 21, 2008. (R, 30: 12-25) 
He also failed to call the employer to report that he would be absent. (R, 30: 23) 
The employer's policy provides that if an employee is a no call, no show it is treated 
as a voluntary quit. The employer's no call, no show policy is contained in its policy and 
procedure packet which is provided to new employees when hired. (R, 31: 1-4) 
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The claimant testified he did not show up for work on April 21,2008, because his feet 
were so sore he could not walk. (R, 27:5-6) He testified he was forced to take a bus to work 
but the last bus stop was over three miles from his employment. (R, 27: 10-15) He testified 
he was then living in a motel with no telephone in the room and that while there was a 
telephone in the front office of the motel, he was unable to walk to the front office to call the 
employer. (R, 26: 41-42, 27:3-6) 
The claimant testified it took "a couple of days" for his feet to get better. His feet 
would have been better by his next scheduled work day, Monday, August 25, 2008, yet he 
failed to report for work that day and failed to call his employer but instead went to a 
Department office to apply for benefits. ( R, 34: 39-40) The claimant told the Department 
representative he had "transportation issues [and] he should have asked for time off, be was 
going thru a lot of hard times. [He] said he knows it's his fault not his employer's but he 
wasn't thinking straight." ( Exhibit 9, R, 9, R, 22: 28-33) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is substantial evidence in the record to show the claimant voluntarily quit his 
employment without good cause making him ineligible for unemployment benefits. The 
denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness under the equity and good conscience 
provisions of the rules. The ALJ and the Board adjudicated all relevant issues, and none of 




THE EMPLOYER PROVIDED SUFFICIENT PROOF OF ITS 
ATTENDANCE POLICY. 
The General Manager of the employer company testified during the hearing that the 
employer's attendance policy provides if an employee misses a full day of work and fails to 
call in by the end of his or her shift, the employer will consider the employee to have quit. 
The same witness testified that the attendance policy is contained in the employer's manual 
which is provided to all employees at the time of hire. The claimant did not object to this 
testimony nor did he challenge the testimony during the hearing. While at one point the 
claimant alluded to an alleged three strikes rule, he did not argue that the employer had such 
a rule or that such a rule would apply to no call, no shows. 
The claimant argues on appeal that because the employer did not provide a copy of 
its written attendance policy prior to or during the hearing, the testimony of the General 
Manager is insufficient to establish the policy existed. The claimant raises this objection for 
the first time in his brief to this court. Throughout these proceedings, the claimant has never 
alleged he did not know what the employer's policy was or that he did not know he might 
lose his job if he was a no call, no show. Because the claimant did not challenge the 
testimony of the General Manager during the hearing, it was not necessary for the employer 
to provide a copy of the policy. The claimant did say that another employee was allowed 
to keep her job after "three strikes," but the employer denied that. If the claimant had 
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provided testimony that he did not know he could be discharged for one occurrence, a copy 
of the employer's policy might have been required to resolve the conflict. Additionally, if 
the claimant had raised the issue during the hearing, the employer may have been given an 
opportunity to provide a copy of its policy. 
Department rule R994-508-109(11) provides that a party must send documentary 
evidence to the ALJ in advance of the hearing. That same rule also states if a party has good 
cause for not providing those documents in advance of the hearing, "the documents will be 
admitted after provisions are made to insure due process is satisfied." By not objecting to 
the testimony of the General Manager at the time of the hearing, and waiting until now to 
raise this issue, the employer is deprived of an opportunity to show good cause. 
This court has consistently held that "issues not raised in proceedings before 
administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional 
circumstances." Brown & Root Indus, v. Industrial Cornm'n 947 P2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) 
as cited in Galley v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 2003 UT App 277. The claimant has not 
shown any exceptional circumstances which would allow him to raise this issue now and the 
court should not consider it. 
The ALJ found the testimony of the General Manager to be credible on the issue of 
the employer's policy regarding attendance. There was ample evidence to support that 
credibility determination. Without an objection raised by the claimant during the hearing, 
that testimony was sufficient to prove the employer's policy. While the claimant now seems 
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to argue that he did not know of the policy, or that the policy was not as it was described by 
the General Manager, that argument is not consist with his actions at the time. 
After missing work on Thursday, August 21,2008, the claimant did not return to work 
for his next scheduled shift which was August 25, 2008. By that date his feet were healed 
but instead of reporting to work, the claimant went to the Department's office to apply for 
benefits. If the claimant believed he still had a job, or he believed the employer had a three 
strikes rule, he would have reported for work once his feet were healed instead of applying 
for benefits. Although the claimant testified he called the employer on August 25,2008, the 
employer's witnesses denied that he called. If the claimant had called the employer that day, 
he would have learned of the job separation yet he testified that he learned he had been 
separated from his job when the Department representative called his employer while he was 
in the Department's office on August 25. (R, 34:39-40) Finally, the claimant told the 
Department representative that he knew that the job separation was "his fault and not his 
employer's" and that he "should have asked for time off. . . but he wasn't thinking straight." 
(Exhibit 9) The ALJ found the employer's witnesses more credible on the issue of whether 
the claimant knew of the policy and whether the claimant called the employer on August 25. 
The employer proved that its attendance policy provided that if an employee failed to 
report for one shift without calling, the employer will treat it as a quit. 
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POINT II 
THE CLAIMANT QUIT HIS EMPLOYMENT, HE WAS NOT 
DISCHARGED. 
The claimant argues that he did not quit his employment nor did he intend to quit his 
employment. In support of his argument the claimant states in his brief that the employer 
made "the initial move to terminate the relationship" by telling the Department representative 
the claimant had quit. The Board disagrees. The claimant made "the initial move" by not 
reporting to work as scheduled, by not calling the employer as required, and by then applying 
for benefits. Department rules provide that it is not which party made "the initial move to 
terminate the relationship" that determines whether a job separation is a quit or a discharge 
but rather, which party was the moving party in ending the relationship. A separation is 
considered a quit under R994-405-101 if the claimant leaves existing work or refuses to 
follow instructions. 
Department rule R994-405-106(1) provides that if "the claimant refused or failed to 
follow reasonable requests or instructions, and knew the loss of employment would result, 
the separation is a quit " The employer's policy provided that one no call, no show would 
be considered a quit. It is reasonable for an employer to require an employee call in when 
the employee is unable to report to work. When an employee fails to call in, the employer 
does not know if the employee will be absent all day or just late. Without knowing, the 
employer is unable to balance the workload in the employee's absence. Although he denies 
it now, the claimant's actions at the time show he knew his failure to call in on August 21 
would result in him being separated from his job. Otherwise he would not have applied for 
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benefits the next work day without talking to the employer. The claimant admitted the 
separation was his fault and not the employer's and he should have asked for time off. Under 
Department rules, that is a quit because he failed to follow a reasonable request of calling in 
knowing it would result in the loss of employment. 
In Duongv. Department of Workforce Services, 2001 UT App 390, the claimant failed 
to follow her supervisor's instructions. Duong contended that she should not have been 
"required to follow her supervisor's instructions if she did not agree with them." In 
upholding the Board's denial of benefits this court held: 
Under the agency's rules, "if a worker refused to follow the reasonable requests 
or instructions knowing the loss of employment would result, the separation 
is a quit." Utah Code Admin. P. R994-405-204(3). Accordingly, the Board 
determined that Duong voluntarily quit her job without good cause. "In 
reviewing these issues, we defer to the agency and we will not overturn its 
decisions regarding voluntariness and good cause unless we determine it has 
abused its discretion." Robinson v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 827 P.2d 250, 
252 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Department Rule R994-405-204 provides the Department determines whether a job 
separation is a quit or a discharge based on the circumstances of the separation as found by 
the Department. Here the claimant's actions show he was the moving party and that he 
intended to end his job with the employer. Not only did he fail to report to work on 
August 21 or call, but he went to the Department on the next work day, August 25, 2008, to 
apply for benefits. Additionally, he told the Department representative that he was at fault 
in the separation, not the employer, and he should have asked for time off. The Department, 
the ALJ, and a unanimous Board found that, by his actions, he voluntarily quit his job. 
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In the similar case of Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P. 2d 625 (Utah 1985), the 
claimant failed to report for work four days in a row. On the first day, the claimant's 
daughter called the employer to report he would be absent. The claimant testified that his 
daughter called on the fourth day also but the claimant's supervisor testified she did not 
receive a call from the daughter on the fourth day. The employer in that case had a policy 
that provided employees must call in every day and if an employee fails to show up for work 
or call in for three consecutive days it would result in discharge. The Board in that case 
found that the daughter did not call on the fourth day and the facts supported a finding that 
the claimant voluntarily quit his job. The Board based that decision on the claimant's failure 
to contact the employer for three days as per that employer's policy. In upholding the Board's 
determination that the job separation was a quit and not a discharge, this court held: 
The burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings is on the 
claimant to establish eligibility for benefits. In the context of this case, this 
burden required plaintiff to show he did not leave work voluntarily. In 
previously construing section 35-4-5(a), [35A-4-405(l)] we have stated that 
"'voluntarily' simply means at the volition of the employee, in contrast to a 
firing or other termination at the behest of the employer." Whether an 
employee left work at his own volition or at that of the employer is a question 
of fact. In reviewing decisions of the commission in unemployment 
compensation proceedings, we are to affirm factual determinations if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. There is substantial evidence on the record 
in this case to support the board's finding that plaintiff left work voluntarily, 
that is, at his own volition. 
There is substantial evidence in this case to support finding the claimant quit his 
employment either by not following the employer's reasonable instructions to call in or by 
not reporting to work and applying for benefits instead. 
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POINT III 
THE CLAIMANT DID NOT ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE FOR 
VOLUNTARILY QUITTING HIS EMPLOYMENT, AND A DENIAL 
OF BENEFITS IS NOT AN AFFRONT TO FAIRNESS UNDER THE 
EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE STANDARD. 
To be eligible for benefits in a voluntary quit, the claimant bears the burden of proving 
he either had good cause for severing the employment relationship, or that it would be an 
affront to fairness to deny benefits under the equity and good conscience provisions of 35A-
4-405(1 )(a). (See Addendum A) The claimant failed to meet his burden of proof. 
The good cause provision, Department rule R994-405-102, provides that a claimant 
must show that an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary to 
avoid a hardship the claimant could not control or prevent. (See Addendum A) 
Hardship requires a showing that the job had an adverse effect causing "actual or 
potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm... [as] measured against 
the actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive." The claimant 
testified that he was unable to show up for work because his feet were sore from walking 
from the bus stop to work and back, as well as being on his feet during the shift. There is no 
evidence that the claimant suffered actual or potential harm by calling the employer to inform 
it of his physical limitations. Additionally, the claimant's testimony was not entirely credible. 
He testified that he had to walk three plus miles from the bus stop to work, stand "for eight 
or nine hours," then "run" to catch the last bus home from work. (R, 27:13-15) Prior to his 
last week of work, the claimant had been working 12 hour shifts doing the same work he was 
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doing when he quit. He failed to explain how walking to and from the bus stop and working 
shorter shifts was harder on his feet than working 12 hour shifts. The claimant also failed 
to explain why he had to "run" to catch the last bus after work. The claimant's shift ended 
at 3:30 p.m. It is presumed that the last bus would not have been before 5 p.m. Additionally, 
while the claimant did not have a telephone in his motel room, there was a telephone at the 
front office of the motel. The claimant's testimony that his feet were too sore to walk to the 
front office was not persuasive. 
The Board is not unsympathetic to the claimant's problems but they do not rise to the 
level of hardship contemplated by the rule. Under the quit rule the hardship must be so 
adverse that the claimant had no reasonable alternative to quitting and that the situation was 
beyond the claimant's ability to control or prevent. The claimant failed to prove that quitting 
was his only option. The claimant could have asked if another employee could drive him to 
and from the bus stop or taken a taxi cab. While that might not seem financially practical, 
it was better than the claimant quitting his job and having no income at all. He might have 
also asked his girlfriend to take him to and from work since he was a half owner of the car. 
In addition to showing hardship and the inability to control the situation, the good 
cause rule requires proof that the employer was given notice and an opportunity "to make 
changes that would eliminate the need to quit. An employee with grievances must have made 
a good faith effort to work out the differences with the employer before quitting unless those 
efforts would have been futile." R994-405-102( 1 )(b)(iii). The claimant failed to tell the 
employer of his problems and failed to show that those efforts would have been futile. 
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Employers are required to reimburse the Department for unemployment benefits paid 
to its former employees. For that reason, the employer must be given an opportunity to try 
and correct a problem and avoid the need for unemployment benefits if possible. The 
General Manager testified that the claimant was a good employee and had in fact been 
awarded the employee of the month award in the past. The employer had no intention of 
discharging the claimant. If the claimant had contacted the employer and explained that he 
was unable to walk to and from the bus stop in addition to working his shift, the employer 
might have been able to help the claimant find alternative transportation. Instead the 
claimant chose to simply not show up for work. There is no evidence the claimant believed 
the employer would not be willing to work with him on his transportation issues. In fact, the 
claimant admitted he should have asked for time off and the separation was his fault. His 
failure to discuss the problem with the employer was not reasonable. Finally, the claimant 
had asked the employer to change his schedule to accommodate his needs and the employer 
promptly complied. There is no evidence the employer would not have helped here. 
This court has consistently held that "unemployment compensation is legislatively 
created to ameliorate the hardship of those who, through no fault of their own, find 
themselves unemployed." Swiecicki v. Department of Employment Sec, 667 P.2d 28, 30 
(Utah 1983) The court has also held "the termination is considered voluntary if it was 'at the 
volition of the employee, in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of the 
employer.'" Adams v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
claimant is not unemployed through no fault of his own. 
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As this court stated in Slane v. Department of Workforce Services, el al, 2000 UT 
App 67, "having a 'good reason' to quit and having 'good cause' to quit are not the same 
thing." It is not at all clear the claimant even had a good reason to quit, let alone good cause. 
The claimant has failed to meet his burden to establish that any of the elements of good cause 
were met. 
Department rule R994-405-107(6) provides: 
If a claimant quits a job due to a lack of transportation, good cause may be 
established if the claimant has no other reasonable transportation options 
available. However, an availability issue may be raised in such a 
circumstance. If a move resulted in an increased distance to work beyond 
normal commuting patterns, the reason for the move, not the distance to the 
work, is the primary factor to consider when adjudicating the separation. 
This rule is not controlling because the claimant did not prove he had no other 
reasonable transportation options. The claimant did not ever investigate other transportation 
options. A claimant is responsible for providing his or her own transportation to and from 
work. A claimant is not considered to be able and available for work if he or she does not 
have the means to become employed which includes transportation under Department rule 
R994-403-110c(2)(b). The claimant worked the new shift only three days before quitting and 
failed to look for other transportation options. His actions do not establish good cause under 
the rule cited above. 
According to the Utah Administrative Code, if good cause is not established, the 
claimant's eligibility must be considered under the equity and good conscience standard 
under Department rule R994-405-103. (See Addendum A) 
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The equity and good conscience rule requires a showing that "there were mitigating 
circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to 
fairness . . .." The rule also requires that the claimant show the decision to quit was 
reasonable. Reasonable is defined as: "logical, sensible, or practical. There must be 
evidence of circumstances which . . . would have motivated a reasonable person to take 
similar action." Finally, the claimant must prove a continuing attachment to the labor market. 
The claimant testified he was performing a job search during the hearing. He is presumably 
attached to the labor market although his transportation problems might make him 
unavailable under R944-403-11 Oc. The claimant's actions however, were not reasonable nor 
were there mitigating circumstances of the type contemplated by the rule. 
As this court held in Pritcher v. Department of Employment Sec, 752 P2.d 917 (Utah, 
1988): 
. . . the equity and good conscience provision is not an occasion for a free-
wheeling judicial foray into the record and imposition of a decision consistent 
with this panel's collective sense of equity and fairness. On the contrary, that 
determination is one for the Department and ultimately the Board of Review, 
see Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(a) (1987), [now §35A-4-405(l)(b)] with this 
court's role limited, as explained above, to deciding whether the findings 
support a decision that "equity and good conscience" do not require 
compensation and whether "evidence of any substance" supports the findings. 
We are obliged to give considerable deference to the Board's determination of 
whether equity requires compensation. Moreover, the concept is not as wide-
open as it might seem, but rather has been defined and refined by statute, id.; 
by rule, Utah Administrative Code R475-5a-3 (1988); and by case law, e.g., 
Chapman v. Industrial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec., 657 P. 2d 1312, 1317 
(Utah 1982). 
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Chapman v. Industrial Cornm % 700 P.2d 1099 (1985), is the only case this author can 
find where Utah's appellate courts reversed a Board decision and allowed benefits under the 
equity and good conscience provision. In that case, the claimant was a 62-year-old woman 
who proved that her supervisor was erratic, swore at the claimant, accused the claimant of 
doing things she had not done, and "subjected the claimant to unreasonable fits of anger." 
The Board denied benefits finding the claimant had an obligation to notify someone in upper 
management about the problem with the supervisor. The claimant in Chapman testified that 
she did not report the supervisor to upper management because the supervisor was in ill 
health and the claimant did not want to be the cause of the supervisor losing her job. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that, given the claimant's age, the intolerable supervisor, and the 
claimant's explanation for not reporting the supervisor, a denial of benefits would be an 
affront to fairness. 
The facts in the present case are substantially different. The claimant here was 48 
years old and had worked at this job for over a year without any problems. Throughout most 
of that employment, he worked 12 hour shifts on his feet. In August 2008 he experienced 
some problems in his personal life which resulted in his loss of transportation. He asked the 
employer to move him to the day shift so he could ride the bus to work. He testified the walk 
from the bus stop to and from work was over three miles and after working eight to nine 
hours his feet were too sore to work. He admitted this was a temporary problem as his feet 
were fine a couple of days later. If the claimant had called his employer when his feet got 
better and investigated ways to keep his job, the result in this case would probably have been 
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different. Instead the claimant filed for benefits admitting the job loss was his fault and not 
the employer's. He admitted that he should have asked for time off implying that with some 
time off he might have solved his problems. His actions were not reasonable. 
The claimant's problems are not the type of mitigating circumstances contemplated 
by the rule. Many workers experience physical problems from working. The reasonable 
response is to find a way to alleviate the pain by making adjustments or seeking medical 
attention. The claimant could have seen a doctor, talked to the employer, found alternative 
transportation or moved closer to work. A denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness. 
POINT IV 
THE CLAIMANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE WORKFORCE 
APPEALS BOARD. 
The finding that the claimant did not have good cause for quitting was based on 
competent evidence in the record, primarily, the testimony of the claimant and the employer. 
In order to successfully challenge this finding, the claimant "must demonstrate that the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." The court should reject the claimant's appeal for her failure to marshal the 
evidence in support of her conclusion that the findings were without foundation. The Board 
recognizes that the claimant is proceeding pro se and might not be held to the strict 
procedural standards expected of claimants who are represented by counsel. However, the 
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burden when challenging a factual finding is an extremely heavy one and the claimant has 
presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden. 
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992), the court refused to entertain 
the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its marshaling burden: 
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the finding 
nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead cites only 
evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. 
Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence favorable to one's 
position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden... ."). We therefore 
assume that the record supports the finding of the trial court. Id. at 820. 
[Emphasis added] 
This court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in 
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872P.2d 1051 (UtahApp. 1994): 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1052. 
The court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves] from 
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court further 
explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to: 
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991); accord In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. 
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Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Oneida at 1053. 
Then, after an appellant has established: 
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial 
court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must show the trial 
court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of 
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 
(quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). Oneida at 1053. 
The claimant here has made no attempt to meet his marshaling burden. He has 
pointed to no evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against 
the clear weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is 
supported by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this court 
held that 
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the 
Board's findings of fact must marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The claimant has raised no competent argument in support of his appeal. This court 
should, therefore, affirm the decision of the Board disqualifying the claimant from the receipt 
of unemployment benefits, pursuant to §3 5 A-4-405( 1) of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 2010. 
PIXTON 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
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35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits. 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is 
ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(1 )(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide, covered employment and earned 
wages for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly 
benefit amount. 
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the 
claimant leaves work under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
(c) Using available information from employers and the claimant, 
the division shall consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness 
of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination 
of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good 
conscience. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant 
who has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's 
spouse to or in a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of 
Subsection (1). 
63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with 
the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
R994-403-110c. Able and Available - General Definition. 
(1) The primary obligation of the claimant is to become reemployed. 
A claimant may meet all of the other eligibility criteria but, if the claimant 
cannot demonstrate ability, availability, and an active good faith effort to 
obtain work, benefits cannot be allowed. 
(2) A claimant must be attached to the labor force, which means the 
claimant can have no encumbrances to the immediate acceptance of full-time 
work. The claimant must: 
(a) be actively engaged in a good faith effort to obtain employment; 
and 
(b) have the necessary means to become employed including tools, 
transportation, licenses, and childcare if necessary. 
R994-405-101. Voluntary Leaving (Quit) - General Information. 
(1) A separation is considered voluntary if the claimant was the 
moving party in ending the employment relationship. A voluntary separation 
includes leaving existing work, or failing to return to work after: 
(a) an employer attached layoff which meets the requirements for 
a deferral under R994-403-108b(l)(c), 
(b) a suspension, or 
(c) a period of absence initiated by the claimant. 
(2) Failing to renew an employment contract may also constitute a 
voluntary separation. 
(3) Two standards must be applied in voluntary separation cases: 
good cause and equity and good conscience. If good cause is not established, 
the claimant's eligibility must be considered under the equity and good 
conscience standard. 
R994-405-102. Good Cause. 
To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the 
employment would have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not 
control or prevent. The claimant must showr that an immediate severance of 
the employment relationship was necessary. Good cause is also established if 
a claimant left work which is shown to have been illegal or to have been 
unsuitable new work. 
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant. 
(a) Hardship. 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made 
the continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, 
sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person so as to outweigh the benefits of 
remaining employed. There must have been actual or potential physical, 
mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by the 
employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the 
actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive. 
(b) Ability to Control or Prevent. 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, 
good cause will not be found if the claimant: 
(i) reasonably could have continued working while looking for 
other employment, 
(ii) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to 
preserve the job like using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments 
to personal circumstances, or, 
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the 
hardship thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes 
that would eliminate the need to quit. An employee with grievances must have 
made a good faith effort to work out the differences with the employer before 
quitting unless those efforts would have been futile. 
(2) Illegal. 
Good cause is established if the claimant was required by the employer 
to violate state or federal law or if the claimant's legal rights were violated, 
provided the employer was aware of the violation and refused to comply with 
the law. 
(3) Unsuitable New Work. 
Good cause may also be established if a claimant left new work which, 
after a short trial period, was unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the 
suitable work test in rule R994-405-306. The fact the claimant accepted a job 
does not necessarily make the job suitable. The longer a job is held, the more 
it tends to negate the argument that the job was unsuitable. After a reasonable 
period of time a contention the quit was motivated by unsuitability of the job 
is generally no longer persuasive. The Department has an affirmative duty to 
determine whether the employment was suitable, even if the claimant does not 
raise suitability as an issue. 
R994-405-103. Equity and Good Conscience. 
(1) If the good cause standard has not been met, the equity and good 
conscience standard must be considered in all cases except those involving a 
quit to accompany, follow, or join a spouse as provided in R994-405-104. If 
there are mitigating circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be 
unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be allowed under the 
provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if the claimant: 
(a) acted reasonably. 
The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit was logical, 
sensible, or practical. There must be evidence of circumstances which, 
although not sufficiently compelling to establish good cause, would have 
motivated a reasonable person to take similar action, and, 
(b) demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market. 
A continuing attachment to the labor market is established if the 
claimant took positive actions which could have resulted in employment 
during the first week subsequent to the separation and each week thereafter. 
An active work search, as provided in R994-403-113c, should have 
commenced immediately after the separation whether or not the claimant 
received specific work search instructions from the Department. Failure to 
show an immediate attachment to the labor market may not be disqualifying 
if it was not practical for the claimant to seek work. Some circumstances that 
may interfere with an immediate work search include illness, hospitalization, 
incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the control of the claimant 
provided a work search commenced as soon as practical. 
R994-405-106. Quit or Discharge. 
(1) Refusal to Follow Instructions. 
If the claimant refused or failed to follow reasonable requests or 
instructions, and knew the loss of employment would result, the separation is 
a quit. 
(2) Leaving Prior to Effective Date of Termination. 
(a) If a claimant leaves work prior to the date of an impending 
reduction of force, the separation is a quit. Notice of an impending layoff does 
not establish good cause for leaving work. However, the duration of available 
work may be a factor in considering whether a denial of benefits would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience. If the claimant is not disqualified for 
quitting, benefits will be denied for the limited period of time the claimant 
could have continued working, as there was a failure to accept all available 
work as required under Subsection 35A-4-403(l)(c). 
(b) If the claimant quit to avoid a disqualifying discharge the 
separation will be adjudicated as a discharge. 
(3) Leaving Work Because of a Disciplinary Action. 
If the disciplinary action or suspension was reasonable, leaving work 
rather than submitting to the discipline, or failing to return to work at the end 
of the suspension period, is considered a quit unless the claimant was 
previously disqualified as a result of the suspension. 
(4) Leave of Absence. 
If a claimant takes a leave of absence for any reason and files a claim 
while on such leave from the employer, the claimant will be considered 
unemployed and the separation is adjudicated as a quit, even though there still 
may be an attachment to the employer. If a claimant fails to return to work at 
the end of the leave of absence, the separation is a quit. 
(5) Leaving Due to a Remark or Action of the Employer or a 
Coworker. 
If a claimant hears rumors or other information suggesting he or she is 
to be laid off or discharged, the claimant has the responsibility to confirm, 
prior to leaving, that the employer intended to end the employment 
relationship. The claimant also has a responsibility to continue working until 
the date of an announced discharge. If the claimant failed to do so and if the 
employer did not intend to discharge or lay off the claimant, the separation is 
a quit. 
(6) Resignation Intended. 
(a) Quit. 
If a claimant gives notice of his or her intent to leave at a future date 
and is paid regular wages through the announced resignation date, the 
separation is a quit even if the claimant was relieved of work responsibilities 
prior to the effective date of the resignation. A separation is also a quit if a 
claimant announces an intent to quit but agrees to continue working for an 
indefinite period as determined by the employer, even though the date of 
separation was determined by the employer. If a claimant resigns but later 
decides to stay and attempts to remain employed, the reasonableness of the 
employer's refusal to continue the employment is the primary factor in 
determining if the claimant quit or was discharged. For example, if the 
employer had already hired a replacement, or taken other action because of the 
claimant's impending quit, it may not be practical for the employer to allow the 
claimant to rescind the resignation, and the separation is a quit. 
(b) Discharge. 
If a claimant submitted a resignation to be effective at a definite future 
date, but was relieved of work responsibilities and was not paid regular wages 
through the balance of the notice period, the separation is considered a 
discharge as the employer was the moving party in determining the final date 
of employment. Merely assigning vacation pay not previously assigned to the 
notice period does not make the separation a quit. 
(7) If an employer tells a claimant it intends to discharge the 
claimant but allows the claimant to stay at work until he or she finds another 
job and the claimant decides to leave before finding another job, the separation 
is a quit. Good cause may be established if it would be unreasonable to require 
a claimant to remain employed after the employer has expressed its intent to 
discharge him or her. 
R994-405-107. Examples of Reasons for Quitting. 
(1) Prospects of Other Work. 
Good cause is established if, at the time of separation, the claimant had 
a definite and immediate assurance of another job or self-employment that was 
reasonably expected to be suitable, full-time, and permanent. However, if the 
new work is later determined to have been unsuitable and it is apparent the 
claimant knew, or should have known, about the unsuitability of the new work, 
but quit the first job and subsequently quit the new job, a disqualification will 
be assessed from the time the claimant quit the first job unless the claimant has 
purged the disqualification through earnings received while on the new job. 
If, after giving notice but prior to leaving the first job, the claimant 
learns the new job will not be available when promised, permanent, full-time, 
or suitable, good cause may be established if the claimant immediately 
attempted to rescind the notice, unless such an attempt would have been futile. 
(a) A definite assurance of another job means the claimant has been 
in contact with someone with the authority to hire, has been given a definite 
date to begin working and has been informed of the employment conditions. 
(b) An immediate assurance of work generally means the 
prospective job will begin within two weeks from the last day the claimant was 
scheduled to work on the former job. Benefits will be denied for failure to 
accept all available work from the prior employer under the provisions of 
Subsection 3 5 A-4-403( 1 )(c) if the claimant files during the period between the 
two jobs. 
(2) Reduction of Hours. 
The reduction of an employee's working hours generally does not 
establish good cause for leaving a job. However, in some cases, a reduction 
of hours may result in personal or financial hardship so severe the 
circumstances justify leaving. 
(3) Personal Circumstances. 
There may be personal circumstances that are sufficiently compelling 
or create sufficient hardship to establish good cause for leaving work, provided 
the claimant made a reasonable attempt to make adjustments or find 
alternatives prior to quitting. 
(4) Leaving to Attend School. 
Although leaving work to attend school may be a logical decision from 
the standpoint of personal advancement, it is not compelling or reasonable, 
within the meaning of the Act. 
(5) Religious Beliefs. 
To support an award of benefits following a voluntary separation due 
to religious beliefs, the work must conflict with a sincerely held religious or 
moral conviction. If a claimant was not required to violate such religious 
beliefs, quitting is not compelling or reasonable within the meaning of the Act. 
A change in the job requirements, such as requiring an employee to work on 
the employee's day of religious observance when such work was not agreed 
upon as a condition of hire, may establish good cause for leaving a job if the 
employer is unwilling to make adjustments. 
(6) Transportation. 
If a claimant quits a job due to a lack of transportation, good cause may 
be established if the claimant has no other reasonable transportation options 
available. However, an availability issue may be raised in such a 
circumstance. If a move resulted in an increased distance to work beyond 
normal commuting patterns, the reason for the move, not the distance to the 
work, is the primary factor to consider when adjudicating the separation. 
(7) Marriage. 
(a) Marriage is not considered a compelling or reasonable 
circumstance, within the meaning of the Act, for quitting employment. 
Therefore, if the claimant quit to get married, benefits will be denied even if 
the new residence is beyond a reasonable commuting distance from the 
claimant's former place of employment. 
(b) If the employer has a rule requiring the separation of an 
employee who marries a coworker, the separation is a discharge even if the 
employer allowed the couple to decide who would leave. 
(8) Health or Physical Condition. 
(a) Although it is not essential for the claimant to have been advised 
by a physician to quit, a contention that health problems required the 
separation must be supported by competent evidence. Even if the work caused 
or aggravated a health problem, if there were alternatives, such as treatment, 
medication, or altered working conditions to alleviate the problem, good cause 
for quitting is not established. 
(b) If the risk to the health or safety of the claimant was shared by 
all those employed in the particular occupation, it must be shown the claimant 
was affected to a greater extent than other workers. Absent such evidence, 
quitting was not reasonable. 
(9) Retirement and Pension. 
Voluntarily leaving work solely to accept retirement benefits is not a 
compelling reason for quitting, within the meaning of the Act. Although it 
may have been reasonable for a claimant to take advantage of a retirement 
benefit, payment of unemployment benefits in this circumstance is not 
consistent with the intent of the Unemployment Insurance program, and a 
denial of benefits is not contrary to equity and good conscience. 
(10) Sexual Harassment. 
(a) A claimant may have good cause for leaving if the quit was due 
to discriminatory and unlawful sexual harassment, provided the employer was 
given a chance to take necessary action to stop the objectionable conduct. If 
it would have been futile to complain, as when the owner or top manager of 
the employer company is causing the harassment, the requirement that the 
employer be given an opportunity to stop the conduct is not necessary. Sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the 
United States Code and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 
(b) "Sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature when: 
(i) submission to the conduct is either an explicit or implicit term 
or condition of employment, or 
(ii) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used as a basis for 
an employment decision affecting the person, or 
(iii) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substantially interfering 
with a person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive work environment, 
(c) Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connotation but does 
not meet the test of sexual discrimination is insufficient to establish good cause 
for leaving work. 
(11) Discrimination. 
A claimant may have good cause for leaving if the quit was due to 
prohibited discrimination, provided the employer was given a chance to take 
necessary action to stop the objectionable conduct. If it would have been futile 
to complain, as when the owner or top manager of the employer company is 
the cause of the discrimination, the requirement that the employer be given an 
opportunity to stop the conduct is not necessary. It is a violation of federal law 
to discriminate against employees regarding compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, age or 
national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive them of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect their employment status because of race, color, 
religion, sex, age or national origin. 
(12) Voluntary Acceptance of Layoff. 
If the employer wishes to reduce its workforce and gives the employees 
the option to volunteer for the layoff, those who do volunteer are separated due 
to reduction of force regardless of incentives. 
R994-405-204. Quit or Discharge. 
The circumstances of the separation as found by the Department 
determine whether it was a quit or discharge. The conclusions on the 
employer's records, the separation notice, or the claimant's report are not 
controlling. 
(1) Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation. 
(a) Discharge. 
If a claimant notifies the employer of an intent to leave work on a 
definite date, and the employer ends the employment relationship prior to that 
date, the separation is a discharge unless the claimant is paid through the 
resignation date. Unless there is some other evidence of disqualifying conduct, 
benefits will be awarded. 
(b) Quit. 
If the claimant gives notice of an intent to leave work on a particular 
date and is paid regular wages through the announced resignation date, the 
separation is a quit even if the claimant was relieved of work responsibilities 
prior to the effective date of resignation. A separation is also a quit if a 
claimant announces an intent to quit but agrees to continue working for an 
indefinite period, even though the date of separation is determined by the 
employer. The claimant is not considered to have quit merely by saying he or 
she is looking for a new job. If a claimant resigns but later decides to stay and 
announces an intent to remain employed, the reasonableness of the employer's 
refusal to continue the employment is the primary factor in determining 
whether the claimant quit or was discharged. If the employer had already hired 
a replacement, or had taken other action because of the claimant's impending 
quit, it may not be practical for the employer to allow the claimant to rescind 
the resignation, and it would be held the separation was a quit. 
(2) Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge. 
If a claimant leaves work in anticipation of a possible discharge and if 
the reason for the discharge would not have been disqualifying, the separation 
is a quit. A claimant may not escape a disqualification under the discharge 
provisions, Subsection 35A-4-405(2)(a), by quitting to avoid a discharge that 
would result in a denial of benefits. In this circumstance the separation is 
considered a discharge. 
(3) Refusal to Follow Instructions. 
If the claimant refused or failed to follow reasonable requests or 
instructions, and knew the loss of employment would result, the separation is 
a quit. 
R994-508-109. Hearing Procedures. 
(1) All hearings will be conducted before an ALJ in such manner as 
to provide due process and protect the rights of the parties. 
(2) The hearing will be recorded. 
(3) The ALJ will regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full 
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity 
to present their positions. 
(4) The decision of the ALJ will be based solely on the testimony 
and evidence presented at the hearing. 
(5) All testimony of the parties and witnesses will be given under 
oath or affirmation. 
(6) All parties will be given the opportunity to provide testimony, 
present relevant evidence which has probative value, cross-examine any other 
party and/or other party's witnesses, examine or be provided with a copy of all 
exhibits, respond, argue, submit rebuttal evidence and/or provide statements 
orally or in writing, and/or comment on the issues. 
(7) The evidentiary standard for ALJ decisions, except in cases of 
fraud, is a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance means evidence 
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is 
offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the 
fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The evidentiary standard 
for determining claimant fraud is clear and convincing evidence. Clear and 
convincing is a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence and means 
that the allegations of fraud are highly probable. 
(8) The ALJ will direct the order of testimony and rule on the 
admissibility of evidence. The ALJ may, on the ALJ's own motion or the motion 
of a party, exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. 
(9) Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming 
to the rules of evidence, may be accepted and will be given its proper weight. A 
party has the responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its possession. When 
a party is in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the evidence, an 
inference may be drawn that the evidence does not support the party's position. 
(10) Official Department records, including reports submitted in 
connection with the administration of the Employment Security Act, may be 
considered at any time in the appeals process including after the hearing. 
(11) Parties may introduce relevant documents into evidence. Parties 
must mail, fax, or deliver copies of those documents to the ALJ assigned to hear 
the case and all other interested parties so that the documents are received three 
days prior to the hearing. Failure to prefile documents may result in a delay of the 
proceedings. If a party has good cause for not submitting the documents three 
days prior to the hearing or if a party does not receive the documents sent by the 
Appeals Unit or another party prior to the hearing, the documents will be admitted 
after provisions are made to insure due process is satisfied. At his or her 
discretion, the ALJ can either: 
(a) reschedule the hearing to another time; 
(b) allow the parties time to review the documents at an in-person 
hearing; 
(c) request that the documents be faxed during the hearing, if possible, 
or read the material into the record in case of telephone hearing; or 
(d) leave the record of the hearing open, send the documents to the 
party or parties who did not receive them, and give the party or parties an 
opportunity to submit additional evidence after they are received and reviewed. 
(12) The ALJ may, on his or her own motion, take additional evidence 
as is deemed necessary. 
(13) With the consent of the ALJ, the parties to an appeal may stipulate 
to the facts involved. The ALJ may decide the appeal on the basis of those facts, 
or may set the matter for hearing and take further evidence as deemed necessary 
to decide the appeal. 
(14) The ALJ may require portions of the testimony be transcribed as 
necessary for rendering a decision. 
(15) All initial determinations made by the Department are exempt from 
the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Appeals from 
initial determinations will be conducted as formal adjudicative proceedings under 
UAPA. 
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KENNETH BOWDREY SSN XXX-XX-X451 
GENERAL DELIVERY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-9999 EMPLOYER PACIFIC FLYWAY WHOLESALE 
Notice: This decision is made on your claim for benefits: 
You voluntarily left your job for personal reasons which you have not shown to be compelling 
You did not establish good cause for leaving by showing that staying in this job would cause sufficient hardship to make it 
necessary for you to quit before finding another job or that you had no reasonable alternative to quitting 
Benefits cannot be allowed under the equity and good conscience provision because you have not shown that your reasons for 
leaving were sufficiently mitigating and/or you have not demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor force 
Benefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(1) of the Utah Employment Security Act beginning January 25, 2009 and ending 
when you have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are 
otherwise eligible To reopen your claim, you can file online at jobs Utah gov or you can call the Claim Center This reopening will 
be effective as of the week you reopen your claim You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim 
RIGHT TO APPEAL If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals 
Section, PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City UT 84145-0244 or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online at www jobs utah gov Your appeal must 
be in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before February 26, 2009 An appeal received or postmarked after 
February 26, 2009 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established Your appeal must be signed by you or 
your legal representative MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS Also, please state the reason for your appeal A copy of your appeal will be 
sent to any other interested parties It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is 
pending You will not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing 
UTAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS S L 526-4400, Ogden 612-0877, Provo 375-4067, Out of Area (888) 848-0688 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-9999 
Respondent 
PACIFIC FLYWAY WHOLESALE 
7035 HIGH TECH DRIVE STE 100 
MIDVALEUT 84047-3759 
S.S.A.NO: XXX-XX-4451 CASE NO: 09-A-03262 
APPEAL DECISION: Good cause for the untimely appeal is found. 
Benefits are denied. 
The Employer is relieved of charges 
CASE HISTORY: Date of Initial Agency Determination: February 11,2009 
Date of Appeal filed by Claimant: March 2, 2009 
Appearances: Claimant/Employer 
Issues to be Decided: 35A-4-406(3) - Timeliness of Appeal 
35A-4-405(l) - Voluntary Quit 
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges 
The Department's decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant voluntarily 
quit without good cause and for reasons that do not meet the standards of equity and good conscience. That 
decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid to the Claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from March 30, 
2009, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://wwwjobs,utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the 
grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Timeliness of Appeal 
The Claimant does not have a direct mailing address and his mail is sent to "general delivery," The Claimant 
picked up his mail at the end of February and learned of the Department's decision to deny benefits. He filed 
an appeal within a few days. 
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Separation 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective January 25,2009, the Claimant worked 
for Pacific Flyway Wholesale, as a shipper, from May 18,2007, until August 21,2008. The Employer has 
an attendance policy. If an employee is not able to appear to work as scheduled, the employee is required 
to contact his or her direct supervisor by the end of the shift. If an employee fails to call as expected, the 
employee is considered to have voluntarily quit. Employees are notified of the policy upon hire. 
The Claimant was a good employee and had received an "employee of the month" award. He worked on 
the weekend shift, working 12-hour shifts Friday through Sunday. In August 2008, the Claimant and his 
girlfriend broke up and the Claimant moved to amotel. He allowed his former girlfriend to keep their shared 
vehicle because she had children. The Claimant advised the Employer of the situation and requested that 
he be allowed to switch to a weekday shift, so he could take public transportation. The Employer agreed. 
The Claimant's new 10-hour shift began at 6 a.m., Monday through Thursday. 
The Claimant worked three days on the new shift. The bus stop is three miles from the work site. The 
Claimant walked to work from the bus, then worked on his feet all day, then walked as quickly as possible 
back to the bus stop to catch the last bus. By the end of the three days, the Claimant's feet were swollen. 
He was unable to walk and did not go to work. He did not call the Employer because there was not a phone 
in his motel room. The Employer considered the Claimant to have quit when he did not appear to work on 
Thursday, August 21,2008. On Monday, August 25,2008, the Claimant went to the local Department of 
Workforce Services office to apply for assistance. The caseworker called the Employer on the Claimant's 
behalf and learned that the Claimant's employment had ended. The Claimant began seeking other work 
closer to public transportation but has not been able to secure any new work as of this time. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Timeliness of Appeal 
Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that the Claimant, or any other party 
entitled to notice of a determination, may file an appeal from such determination within ten days after the 
date of mailing of the notice to his last-known address or, if the notice is not mailed, within ten days after 
the date of delivery of the notice. However, Rule R994-508-102 adds an additional five days when the 
determination is sent through the U. S. mail, for a total of fifteen (15) days rather than ten. The 
unemployment insurance rules pertaining to this section provide, in part: 
R994-508-104. Good Cause for Not Filing Within Time Limitations. 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is determined that the appeal was 
delayed for good cause. Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is shown that: 
(1) the appellant received the decision after the expiration of the time limit for filing 
the appeal, the appeal was filed within ten days of actual receipt of the decision and the delay 
was not the result of willful neglect; 
ADDENDUM C 
Kenneth Bowdrey - 3 - 09-A-03262 
(2) the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the appellant's 
control; or 
(3) the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which were compelling 
and reasonable. 
The Claimant has established good cause for the untimely appeal because he did not receive the decision 
until after the time to timely file an appeal had passed, and he filed an appeal within ten days of receiving 
the decision. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. 
Separation 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules provide in Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) that a separation is a discharge if 
the Employer is the moving party in determining the date the employment ended. The Unemployment 
Insurance Rules provide in Section 35A-4-4O50) that a separation is a voluntary quit if the Claimant is the 
moving party in determining the date the employment ended. The Employer argues that the Claimant was 
the moving party in the separation because he failed to appear to work as scheduled on August 21, 2008, 
thereby abandoning his job. The Claimant also failed to appear to work the following Monday and applied 
for assistance the same day, making it apparent that the Claimant did not intend to return to work. 
Therefore, the Claimant was the moving party in determining the date the employment ended and the 
separation is a voluntary quit. 
Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that an individual is ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period if a claimant left work voluntarily without good 
cause or if a denial of benefits would not be contrary to equity and good conscience. The unemployment 
insurance rules pertaining to this section provide, in part: 
R994-405-102. Good Cause. 
To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing employment would have 
caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not control or prevent. The claimant must 
show an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary. Good cause 
is also established if a claimant left work which is shown to have been illegal or to have been 
unsuitable new work. 
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant. 
(a) Hardship. 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the continuance 
of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse to a reasonable 
person to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must have been actual or 
potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by 
the employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the actions of an 
average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive. 
039 
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(b) Ability to Control or Prevent. 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good cause may not 
be established if the claimant: 
(i) reasonably could have continued working while looking for other employment, or 
(ii) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to preserve the job. 
Examples include using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to personal 
circumstances, or, 
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship 
thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes that would eliminate the 
need to quit. An employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to work out 
the differences with the employer before quitting unless those efforts would have been futile. 
The Claimant did not quit because he was required by the Employer to violate the law. His legal rights were 
not violated, nor did the Employer refuse to comply with the law. Further, he did not quit because the work 
itself was unsuitable. The Claimant quit because his feet had become swollen after walking from the bus 
to the work site and back three days in a row. The Claimant was harmed by the change in his transportation 
and the pain it caused in his feet. However, he did not notify the Employer of the problem with his 
transportation and made no effort to notify the Employer that he was unable to work. Had he notified the 
Employer of the problem with his feet, the Employer might have been able to give him time off or helped 
him find alternative transportation, such as having a coworker pick him up at the bus stop. Therefore, good 
cause for quitting has not been established. 
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provide, in pertinent part: 
R994-405-103. Equity and Good Conscience. 
(1) If the good cause standard has not been met, the equity and good conscience 
standard must be applied in all cases except those involving a quit to accompany, follow, or 
join a spouse as outlined in Section R994-405-104. If there are mitigating circumstances, 
and a denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may 
be allowed under the provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if the following 
elements are satisfied: 
(a) the decision is made in connection with the employer; 
(b) the claimant acted reasonably; 
(c) the claimant demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market. 
040 
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(2) The elements of equity and good conscience are defined as follows:... 
(b) The Claimant Acted Reasonably. 
The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit was logical, sensible or practical. 
There must be evidence of circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to 
establish good cause, would have motivated a reasonable person to take similar action. 
Behaviors that may be acceptable to a particular subculture do not establish what is 
reasonable. 
(c) Continuing Attachment to the Labor Market. 
A continuing attachment to the labor market is established if the claimant took positive 
actions which could have resulted in employment during the first week subsequent to the 
separation and each week thereafter. Evidence of an attachment to the labor market may 
include: making contacts with prospective employers, preparing resumes, and developing 
job leads. An active work search should have commenced immediately subsequent to the 
separation whether or not the claimant received specific work search instructions from the 
Department. Failure to show an immediate attachment to the labor market may not be 
disqualifying if it was not practical for the individual to seek work. Some examples of 
circumstances that may interfere with an immediate work search include illness, 
hospitalization, incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the control of the claimant 
provided a work search commenced as soon as practical. 
The Claimant has shown that he had an immediate attachment to the labor market after voluntarily quitting 
his position. However, he has not established that it was reasonable, practical, or logical to quit prior to 
checking every reasonable avenue to preserve the job. It was not reasonable for the Claimant to fail to 
advise the Employer of his problems with his feet. The Claimant could have found some way to contact the 
Employer before the end of the 10-hour shift, even if his motel room did not have a telephone, Therefore, 
the standards of equity and good conscience have not been met. Benefits are denied. 
Employer Charges 
An employer may be relieved of charges when a claimant was separated from employment for reasons which 
would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(l) or Section 35A-4-4Q5(2) of the Act. 
In this case, the reason for the Claimant's separation is disqualifying, therefore, the Employer is relieved of 
charges, 
DECISION AND ORDER: 
Timeliness of Appeal 
Good cause for the late filing of the appeal was established pursuant to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge, therefore, has jurisdiction to consider the merits 
of the case. 
04 
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Separation 
The Department's decision denying unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 
35A~4~405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act is herein affirmed. The Claimant is denied 
unemployment insurance benefits effective January 25, 2009, and continuing until the Claimant has 
performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at least 
six times his weekly benefit amount and is otherwise eligible. 
Employer Charges 
The Department's decision relieving the Employer of charges for its prorated share of benefit costs paid to 
the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of Section 35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act is 
herein affirmed. The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with^WTchim. 
Amanda B. McPeck 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORJCFORCE SERVICES 
Issued: March 30, 2009 
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ISSUE 01 Department of Workforce Services 
Division of Adjudication 
KENNETH BOWDREY, CLAIMANT 
S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-4451 : 
: Case No. 09-B-00367 
PACIFIC FLYWAY WHOLESALE, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are denied. 
The Employer is eligible for relief of benefit charges. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated March 30,2009, Case No. 09-A-03262, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed 
a Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective 
January 25,2009. The Employer, Pacific Flyway Wholesale, was found eligible for relief of benefit 
charges in connection with this claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: April 3, 2009. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Claimant have good cause to quit his employment pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(l)? 
2. Is it contrary to equity and good conscience to deny unemployment insurance benefits 
pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l)? 
3. Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)? 
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FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked in the Employer's shipping department and had been working the weekend 
shift. The Claimant and his girlfriend shared a vehicle and the Claimant was able to coordinate 
transportation to the weekend shift with his girlfriend. The Claimant and his girlfriend broke up and 
he no longer had access to a vehicle. The Claimant notified the Employer of his transportation 
problem, and the Employer agreed to transfer the Claimant to a day shift, Monday through Friday, 
so he could use public transportation to get to and from work. The Claimant worked three days on 
the new shift and decided it was not going to work for him, because the bus dropped him off three 
and one half miles from the Employer's facility. By the time the Claimant completed his shift, 
walked to the bus stop, and arrived home his legs were swollen. The Claimant quit going to work 
and did not inform the Employer of his physical condition. The Administrative Law Judge found 
the Claimant quit without good cause and his decision to quit was not reasonable under the standard 
of equity and good conscience. 
On appeal to the Board, the Claimant references the case Pacheco V. Board of Review, 717 p.2d 712 
(Utah 1986), as a standard for good cause. In the Pacheco case the Claimant was late filing the 
appeal after being told by the Administrative Law Judge to file an appeal as soon as possible rather 
than within the next 10 days. The court found the Claimant had good cause for the untimely appeal 
because the Claimant was misled by the Administrative Law Judge. The Pacheco case is not relevant 
to the Claimant' s job separation, because there is no issue of a late filing in this case. The good 
cause standard the Claimant must show in quitting his job is outlined as follows: 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act provide, in pertinent part: 
R994-4G5-102. Good Cause. 
To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the 
employment would have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not 
control or prevent. The claimant must show that an immediate severance of the 
employment relationship was necessary. Good cause is also established if a claimant 
left work which is shown to have been illegal or to have been unsuitable new work. 
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant. 
(a) Hardship. 
09-B-00367 - 3 - XXX-XX-4451 
KENNETH BOWDREY 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the 
continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse 
to a reasonable person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There 
must have been actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or 
professional harm caused or aggravated by the employment. The claimant's decision 
to quit must be measured against the actions of an average individual, not one who 
is unusually sensitive. 
(b) Ability to Control or Prevent. 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good 
cause will not be found if the claimant: 
(i) reasonably could have continued working while looking for other 
employment, 
(ii) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to 
preserve the job like using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to 
personal circumstances, or, 
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the 
hardship thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes that 
would eliminate the need to quit. An employee with grievances must have made a 
good faith effort to work out the differences with the employer before quitting unless 
those efforts would have been futile. 
(2) Illegal. 
Good cause is established if the claimant was required by the employer to 
violate state or federal law or if the claimant's legal rights were violated, provided the 
employer was aware of the violation and refused to comply with the law. 
(3) Unsuitable New Work. 
Good cause may also be established if a claimant left new work which, after 
a short trial period, was unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the suitable 
work test in rule R994-405-306. The fact the claimant accepted a job does not 
necessarily make the job suitable. The longer a job is held, the more it tends to 
negate the argument that the job was unsuitable. After a reasonable period of time 
a contention the quit was motivated by unsuitability of the job is generally no longer 
persuasive. The Department has an affirmative duty to determine whether the 
employment was suitable, even if the claimant does not raise suitability as an issue. 
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The Claimant has not shown any hardship that was caused or aggravated by his employment. The 
Claimant had transportation issues, and while this affected his ability to attend work, work was not 
the cause of his transportation issues. Furthermore, the Employer had already demonstrated a 
willingness to work with the Claimant by adjusting his schedule. Once the Claimant decided the 
adjusted schedule was not going to work, he made no effort to contact the Employer to see if there 
was any other alternative such as riding with a coworker. The Claimant argues on appeal that he 
never had a chance to speak with the Employer. However, the record shows the Claimant never 
attempted to speak with the Employer prior to the separation. He just simply quit coming to work. 
The Board does not find the Claimant had good cause to quit his employment, nor was his decision 
to quit reasonable under the standard of equity and good conscience. 
The Board affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and adopts in full her reasoning and 
conclusions of law. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying benefits to the Claimant effective January 25, 
2009, pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act, is 
affirmed. 
The Employer, Pacific Flyway Wholesale, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with 
this claim as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to 
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
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fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,' 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
JS BOARD 
Date Issued: May 18, 2009 
TV/TL/WS/am/sp/ks 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 18th day of May, 2009, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
United States mail to: 
KENNETH BOWDREY 
GENERAL DELIVERY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-9999 
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT 
PACIFIC FLYWAY WHOLESALE 
7035 HIGH TECH DR STE 100 
MIDVALE UT 84047-3759 
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Statement. SP - Separation (Voluntary qu,^ ADDENDUM E 
Claimant Name KENNETH BOWDREY 
Claimant SSN 414 11 4451 
Created By David Allen - 01/28/09 
Empnd 130950-1 
Empr PACIFIC FLYWAY WHOLESALE 
Address 7035 HIGH TECH DR STE 100 
WS Name 
Address 
Print Date 03/09/09 
Answer modified'? 
City/ST/Zip MIDVALE, UT 84047-3759 City/ST/Zip 
Phone (801)304-4300 Phone 
Start Dt 05/18/07 End Dt 08/25/08 Pro Athlete 
RFS VQ - Voluntary quit Send Med Form 
Did you retire/quit for medical or health reasons7 No 
Did you give advance notice of your intention to quit7 No 
Did your employer require you to leave before your intended quit date7 No 
Were you paid through your intended quit date7 Yes 
Cleared on PBY 
CImt Earn 6xWBA Yes 
Comment Created By David Allen 01/28/09 @ 04 45 PM 
Transportation issues CImt said he should have asked for time off but was going thru a lot of hard times Said 
he knows its his fault not his employers but he wasnt thinking straight 
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OfiQ 
JUDGE So I am trying to get into a back up system. It hasn't even pulled up Exhibit 3 for me 
yet. I apologize here folks I should have known it was going to happen because its 
Monday morning. They are always slow on Monday morning. Okay-okay then Exhibit 
#4 is a uh notation from uh Raquel Cook a case manager a note to the Department. 
Exhibit #5 is the original claim for unemployment benefits. Now this-this document is 
made when you open a claim. They go through all of those questions with you and all 
those instructions this is where that uh stays and it continues on to Exhibits #6, 7 and 
8. Exhibit #9 says statement sp dash separation and then in parenthesis voluntary quit. 
Now when you call in to indicate or to open a claim the claims taker will ask you 
questions about what happened with your job and they'll put it in either a quit category 
or a discharge category. Uh and then they take they take notes about what you tell 
them about what happened, so Mr. Bowdrey if you'll look just at the middle of that 
page do you see the line across the page just under it says comment created by David 
Allen created January the 28th and then it starts talking about transportation issues and 
everything. 
CLAIMANT On the 8th? 
JUDGE Yeah you see oh page nine? 
CLAIMANT Uh-huh. 
JUDGE Look at the two lines right in the middle of the page that begins transportation issues. 
Do you see that? 
CLAIMANT No ma'am. 
JUDGE On Exhibit 9. The last two lines on the page. 
CLAIMANT Oh-oh. Yes ma'am. 
JUDGE Okay does that look like what you told the Department when you opened your claim 
for unemployment back in January? 
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am. 
JUDGE Okay. I just wanted to make sure they didn't write it down wrong. Now Exhibit #10 is 
an adjudication case note. When the Department representatives call you and ask more 
questions about what happened they have to take notes too so if you look at that last 
paragraph on Exhibit #10 Mr. Bowdrey-
CLAIMANT Yeah I see it. 
JUDGE - where it begins my feet swelled up-
















































Can you tell me what specifically was the situation what were the lots of things you 
were-
CLAIMANT Well I had to move I had to move out of my house you know you know they and 
things I had you know I had no kin people there to help me no whatsoever so I was 
going through a lot of stress you know a lot of headaches and all that you know so um 
I was constantly trying to work but what I should have done and I know I was wrong 
by doing that I should have uh-uh at least uh told them I need some time I was trying 
to straighten some things out but I want to thank him I was trying to keep my job and 
uh and I just want to thank him you know. 
JUDGE Now did they did they tell you that you were fired or did-




What days of the week were you supposed to work what daysr 
Uh they uh changed me to the weekdays but that was just temporary. I was working 
weekends. 
So did you now show up to work for a few days? 
Yes ma'am that's all you know. Just too late they didn't give me chance to do nothing 
you know cause you know my supervisor really didn't want me to work on that shift 
because he-he already know I believe he already know they wanted to get rid of me, 
you know-
JUDGE Okay. 
CLAIMANT So, you know. And uh-
JUDGE Did you call oh excuse me I'm sorry. 
CLAIMANT So that's-that's how come he really didn't want me to get on that shift, you know. 
Okay did you call in every day that you were gone? JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
Ma'am I was I didn't have no phone or nothing you know you know I didn't have 
nothing and I was staying in a motel didn't have no phone so-
You were in a motel that didn't have a phone? 
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am they it was one of them old uh this old messed up place-
JUDGE How about the front desk would they let you use the phone at the front desk? 
CLAIMANT Ma'am I don't know I couldn't even walk ma'am that's all I know. It took me a couple 
of days before I got my feet back together. 
JUDGE What was can you tell me what was going on with your feet? 
CLAIMANT See ma'am look yeah for one thing I was catching the bus. You know me I have no 
transportation no nothing to do nothing you know me so therefore when I catch the bus 
they bus don't take me all the way out there. I had to get off the bus and walk about 3 
and a half more miles to get to work. Then when I get to work I got to stand on my fee 
t for eight or nine hours then I had to run back for three and a half miles trying to catch 
the last bus you know. That was a lot of pressure on me ma'am a lot of headaches. 
JUDGE So what happened to your feet were they inured? 
CLAIMANT How do you think ma'am I'm 48 years old I can't be ripping and running like that you 
know me. I'm 48 I'm not twenty something. 
JUDGE Well I don't know you sir that's why I have to ask you the questions. 
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am yeah I respect that ma'am. 
JUDGE Okay. So you'd been working there for quite a while for over a year-
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am I have never missed a day of nothing when I was working there for them. I 
never been late for nothing. 
JUDGE Up to that point? 
CLAIMANT Up to that point. 
JUDGE Okay so what happened to your transportation? 
CLAIMANT Well the bus uh we had only one transportation at the time ma'am, so she you know 
she had you know I left here with the car cause she had to take the kids you know her 
daughter to uh school today you know so therefore that leave me with nothing. 
JUDGE So you gave your girlfriend your car? 
CLAIMANT We had bought it together so we gave I gave-
JUDGE You had it together. 
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CLAIMANT Yes ma'am. 
JUDGE Okay. Okay it looked like uh from the kind of jobs that you had been doing before that 
you had gotten some work through staffing agencies in the past-
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Have you been keeping in contact with them? 
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am I they didn't have nothing so far. I've been constant uh I been constant uh 
filing application everywhere at different agents (?) and different places you know so 
and I've been going through the company inviting (?) myself trying to get a job. 
JUDGE Okay. Well Mr. Bowdrey I don't have any more questions for you today about what 
happened with Pacific. Can you think of anything else you'd like to tell me about that 
situation sir? 
CLAIMANT No ma'am. 
JUDGE Mr. Williams did you have any questions for Mr. Bowdrey? 
WILLIAMS Uh no questions no. 
JUDGE Okay. Now of the two of you gentleman there who is going to testify first you Mr. 
Williams or Mr. Jarvis? 
WILLIAMS I'll go ahead. 
JUDGE All right Mr. Williams if you could state your full legal name for the record sir. 
WILLIAMS Yeah Jeremy D. Williams. 
JUDGE And what is your position there with pacific? 
WILLIAMS General Manager. 
JUDGE Is it correct that Mr. Bowdrey worked in the shipping Department? 
WILLIAMS Yes it is. 
JUDGE And it is correct that he began working there in May of 2007? 
WILLIAMS Yep uh 5-18 of '-07. The last day worked was August 20th of 2008. 
i? 
JUDGE Okay. Now uh what was his schedule at that time what hours was he working at that 
point do you know? 
WILLIAMS Well he was working our weekend shift which is a Friday, sturdy and Sunday shift. 
Twelve hour days um about a week before his uh last day worked he did tell us his 
situation he was going through. Uh we came to an agreement that we would put him 
on a shift that would uh accommodate his needs-
JUDGE You mean like the bus schedule? 
WILLIAMS No uh he said that he could not work the weekend shift just for transportation reasons 
that he could work a first shift which is a Monday through Thursday. Uh it's a morning 
shift he said that getting transportation would be a whole lot easier to work that shift. 
JUDGE Okay and what time does that shift start? 
WILLIAMS Well at the time it was at six o'clock in the morning. 
JUDGE Until when? 
WILLIAMS Three thirty. So we agreed to move him to uh to the first shift which is a Monday 
through Thursday am uh shift. Uh he did show up for two or three days um but then 
after that he just quit coming to work. He didn't call anybody and it is company policy 
if you don't contact your employer by the end of that uh shift you are voluntarily 
terminated. 
JUDGE So you have a one no call no show is a termination-
WILLIAMS Correct yep. 
JUDGE Now he says he recalls uh contacting on Monday august 25th. Is that correct? 
WILLIAMS Uh I who did you talk to I he didn't talk to me? 
JUDGE Okay but I he didn't talk to you on Monday? 
WILLIAMS No. 
JUDGE Did he ever return or call you that you recall? 
WILLIAMS Nope never talked to me personally ma'am. 
JUDGE Okay. Now how do you make or do you let me rephrase this sorry. Do you have like an 
employee manual that says one no call no show? 
n 
WILLIAMS Yes we do. Uh anytime we hire an employee they are given an employee packet and 
through that uh packet it pretty much tells them all of our procedures policies and 
procedures. And under attendance uh it does that uh if you do your no call no show 
you are you have uh voluntarily quit your employment. 
CLAIMANT But excuse me I object on that Your Honor. Uh for one thing they stated that it's a no 
show no call but I know a lady that worked there once before-
9 JUDGE Mr. Bowdrey-
0 
1 CLAIMANT Wait a minute wait a minute-
2 
3 JUDGE No you need to listen to me. 
4 
5 CLAIMANT Yes ma'am. 
6 





































Okay and I understand your that your objecting to what he is saying-
Yes. 
But he gets the right to tell me his side of the story and then I will let you respond to 
his testimony in a moment okay? 
All right. Thank you ma'am. 
Your welcome. All right Mr. Williams since I don't have any other questions for you 
is there anything else that you would like to add to your testimony? 
Um other than the fact that Ken things we were out to terminate him to get rid of him 
that's definitely not the case. I mean we have documentation saying that Ken was a 
great employee. You know he's won employee of the month award. I mean up to this 
point I mean he was a great employee but this is he violated company policy. I mean 
that's the fact right there he even admitted so-so that's pretty much all I have to say. 
Now Mr. Bowdrey do you have questions you'd like to ask Mr. Williams? 
Yes-yes of course. Uh they say that three days of strikes you out of there but I recall a 
person that was working there once before and uh I'm not mistaken she didn't call one 
notsoever but she still had a job. That's what I can't understand. 
Okay Mr. Williams are let me help you let me turn this into a question. 
i / i 
and so you know I agreed and he was moved to my shift and then I believe urn he was 
there only one or two days that I recall. 
JUDGE Did you have any problems with his work? 
JARVIS No. 
JUDGE Did you have room for him on you team? 
JARVIS Yes we did. 
JUDGE Okay. I don't have any further questions for you Mr. Jarvis. Can you think of anything 
else you'd like to tell me? 
JARVIS Um I would just second uh what Jeremy Williams just said is that um you know Ken 
was in good standing with our company as an outstanding employee on the third shift 
and uh you know we were willing and able to help by moving him to another shift and 
were very wiling to help him through some of the things but as Jeremy mentioned 
earlier our company policy is no call no show and it's a voluntary abandonment of 
their position so according to-to our company policy is that I am required to follow and 
uphold as a manager I-I didn't have any choice but to terminate him. 
JUDGE Mr. Williams did you have any other questions for Mr. Jarvis? 
WILLIAMS No I don't. 
JUDGE Okay. Mr. Bowdrey did you have questions for Mr. Jarvis? 
CLAIMANT No I just wanted uh-
JUDGE Would you like to add something to your testimony? 
CLAIMANT I'd just like to you know thank them for giving me the opportunity and uh I did make 
the mistake so you know and um so that's all I got. 
JUDGE You I had one other question for you Mr. Bowdrey. You had said before that you knew 
th you were terminated on the 25 . How did you find that out? 
CLAIMANT Uh I was trying to get some kind of assistance at the moment I think it was and they 
called the place and uh that's how I found out. 
JUDGE So like at Workforce services a case worker called for you? 
CLAIMANT Yes ma'am. 
